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Abstract : In markets where hospitals are expected to compete, preventive
merger control aims to prohibit anticompetitive mergers. In the hospital industry,
however, the standard method for defining the relevant market (SSNIP) is difficult
to apply and alternative approaches have proven inaccurate. Experiences from the
United States show that courts, by identifying overly broad geographic markets,
have underestimated the anticompetitive effects of hospital mergers. We examine
how geographic hospital markets are defined in Germany and the Netherlands
where market-oriented reforms have created room for hospital competition.
For each country, we discuss a landmark case where definition of the geographic
market played a decisive role. Our findings indicate that defining geographic
hospital markets in both countries is less complicated than in the United States,
where antitrust analysis must take managed care organisations into account.
We also find that different methods result in much more stringent hospital merger
control in Germany than in the Netherlands. Given the uncertainties in defining
hospital markets, the German competition authority seems to be inclined to avoid
the risk of being too permissive; the opposite holds for the Dutch competition
authority. We argue that for society the costs of being too permissive with regard
to hospital mergers may be larger than the costs of being too stringent.
1. Introduction
Market-oriented healthcare reforms have in recent years created hospital com-
petition in both Germany and in the Netherlands (Lisac et al., 2010; Schut and
van de Ven, 2011).1 For such competition to be effective, insurers and patients
*Correspondence to: Professor Marco Varkevisser, Institute of Health Policy & Management (iBMG),
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Room J8-03, P.O. Box 1738, Rotterdam 3000, The Netherlands. Email:
varkevisser@bmg.eur.nl
1 A detailed description of the healthcare systems in both countries is beyond the scope of this paper.
Country summaries for Germany and the Netherlands can be found in Commonwealth Fund (2010).
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must be able to choose from a sufficient number of alternative providers.
Competitive pressures, however, generally provoke consolidation (mergers) of
healthcare providers, including hospitals. To safeguard competition, both German
and Dutch hospital merger proposals are subject to antitrust law. The common
objective of preventive merger control is to protect consumer welfare by prohi-
biting anticompetitive mergers.2 Defining the relevant geographic market is
necessary to this process because antitrust authorities typically use market shares
to make inferences about the likely effects of mergers. Although appropriate
market definition is challenging in any industry, it is particularly so in the hospital
industry. In general, antitrust enforcement agencies use the ‘Small but Significant
Non-transitory Increase in Price’ (SSNIP) test to define the relevant market,3 which
is difficult to implement in hospital markets for at least two reasons. First, prices
for most hospital services are regulated. A hospital’s quality elasticity of demand
rather than its price elasticity is then of primary interest. Second, in (sub)markets
where prices are not regulated,4 the necessary data for estimating hospitals’ price
elasticities are most often unavailable (Capps et al., 2002). Actual prices negotiated
between hospitals and insurers are not readily available and even if these prices
are available to antitrust agencies as part of their merger review, they do not
represent the costs faced by patients. As the vast bulk of hospital services is
covered by health insurance, hospitals are largely reimbursed by third-party
payers; the patient, therefore, has a price elasticity close or equal to zero. Because
of the difficulty of applying the SSNIP test in hospital markets, geographic market
definition has historically relied heavily upon two alternative, less formal
approaches: the Elzinga–Hogarty (E–H) test and critical loss analysis.
In this article, we examine the role of geographic market definition in hospital
merger control. Using evidence from the United States, we explain why geographic
2 Courts and antitrust enforcement agencies in both the United States and Europe tend to use a
consumer welfare standard (Motta, 2004: 19) for mergers. Recent papers, however, have discussed the
proper objective of competition policy (e.g. Heyer, 2006; Carlton, 2007; Pittman, 2007). Although
economists generally prefer total welfare, an important argument in favour of the consumer welfare
standard is that it simplifies decisions in merger cases. That is, the use of a total welfare standard entails a
difficult exercise in quantifying the changes in consumer and producer surplus to assess net welfare
effects. In addition, horizontal mergers typically result in welfare transfers from consumers to producers
that are likely to be quite regressive.
3 The SSNIP test begins by positing a narrowly defined market (e.g. one particular zip code) and
asking whether a hypothetical monopolist of all firms and products in the posited geographic market
could profitably implement a SSNIP. If the monopolist cannot do so, then the proposed market is too
narrow and neighbouring zip codes should be included. The procedure is repeated until the answer is
affirmative.
4 Since 2005, in the Dutch healthcare system, hospitals and health insurers are allowed to freely
negotiate prices for part of the hospital services. Initially, this part was limited to 10% of total hospital
expenditure, but the room for price negotiations was gradually expanded to 34% in 2011 and 70% in
2012. The prices of the rest of the hospital services are regulated. To prevent a hospital from setting an
extraordinarily high price for the non-regulated services, insurers are allowed to selectively contract with
hospitals or channel patients to hospitals with which favourable contracts are negotiated.
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market definition can be seen as the Achilles’ heel of hospital merger control.
We then focus on hospital merger control in Germany and the Netherlands,
discussing a landmark case for each where definition of the relevant geographic
market played a decisive role.5
2. Geographic market definition: Achilles’ heel of hospital merger control
No country has more experience with hospital merger enforcement than the United
States. After the first hospital merger was challenged in 1981, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initially had considerable
success litigating hospital merger cases.6 From 1989 to 2001, however, the federal
antitrust agencies were defeated in all but one case brought to court (Gaynor and
Vogt, 2000; Ashenfelter et al., 2011).7 Most were lost because the court identified
highly expansive geographic markets that resulted in low post-merger concentra-
tion levels.8 Supported by empirical evidence on the anticompetitive effects of
consummated hospital mergers (e.g. Vita and Sacher, 2001; Simpson, 2003), the
courts’ reasoning in these cases was widely criticised (e.g. Greaney, 2002; Conners,
2003; Richman, 2007). Most importantly, by accepting the E–H test or critical loss
analysis to define the relevant geographic market, courts systematically under-
estimated the potential anticompetitive effects. Both approaches have proven
inaccurate. Their most important shortcomings are summarised below.9
5 Within the European Union (EU), decisions on proposed hospital mergers are generally made by
national antitrust enforcement agencies. Hospital mergers with an impact beyond the national borders are
rare. In 2007, the European Commission (EC) reviewed a proposal under which two providers of
investment management [UK’s APW (Apax Partners Worldwide LLP) and France’s APSA (Apax Partners
SA)] and a Jersey-based private equity firm (Nordic Capital) would acquire joint control over Capio, a
Swedish healthcare provider and owner of private hospitals, diagnostic centres and private psychiatric
hospitals in a wide range of EU member states, including the United Kingdom, where APW already
controlled a healthcare service provider. Using a separate product market for acute general hospital
services provided by private hospitals, the EC concluded that the merger would raise serious competition
concerns in the United Kingdom. As the EC argued that most patients do not travel far for treatment,
geographic hospital markets were defined as local. The proposal was therefore approved, conditional to
the divestiture of Capio’s UK-based private acute general hospitals, its independent sector treatment
centres outsourcing business and specialist eye hospital (EC, 2007).
6 The FTC and DOJ decide between themselves which agency will be responsible for the merger
assessment.
7 In this context, ‘court’ means court or administrative law judge (ALJ) or full FTC; different cases
are decided by different entities. If the FTC seeks a temporary injunction to block a merger pending trial,
it will do so in federal district court. The ensuing trial, if it occurs, would be held before an ALJ, which
decides the legality of the transaction. The ALJ’s decision can be appealed to the full five-member FTC
and ultimately the Supreme Court. In contrast, if the DOJ is responsible for reviewing the merger, the
legality of the transaction is litigated in federal district court. A decision at that stage may be appealed to
the circuit court and ultimately the Supreme Court.
8 The additional two cases were lost (at least in part) because the court ruled that the non-profit
nature of the merging hospitals made the exercise of post-merger market power unlikely (Ashenfelter
et al., 2011).
9 See for a more detailed discussion of both methods Varkevisser et al. (2008).
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2.1 E–H test
The E–H test is easy to apply and uses commonly available patient flow data. It
begins with a narrowly defined market and then expands the boundary until
threshold conditions are met for both imports [‘little in from outside’ (LIFO)]
and exports [‘little out from inside’ (LOFI)] of hospital services.10 In various
court cases, the analysis has focussed on identifying geographic areas such that
both statistics are either below 25% (‘weak market’) or 10% (‘strong market’).
The central problem underlying the E–H test is the ‘silent majority fallacy’
(Capps et al., 2002): the presence of travelling patients who import and export
hospital services does not necessarily discipline hospitals from exercising market
power over the silent majority of non-travelling patients. In other words, in
markets with heterogeneous tastes for different services, the presence of some
travelling patients with one set of needs does not necessarily restrain the pricing
of services to non-travelling patients with different needs. Suppose that 25% of
all patients in an area travel significant distances to receive care. This does not in
any way indicate that the remaining 75% would be willing to similarly travel in
response to a price increase – the assumption implicit in the E–H test. Hence,
price increases are certainly feasible even in the presence of significant patient
outflows. One might argue that use of the E–H test would be less problematic if
disaggregated clusters of hospital services that are close substitutes were ana-
lysed. However, this would only solve part of the problem, as it incorrectly
assumes that the only reason the ‘silent majority fallacy’ exists is that patients’
propensity to travel varies across types of hospital care. Other reasons the propensity
to travel varies include, for example, unobserved personal preferences. Selecting a
non-arbitrary way to aggregate the results of disaggregated, hospital service-level
E–H analyses is also problematic. In a recent antitrust complaint involving a merged
hospital (Box 1), both the FTC and the defendants agreed that applying the E–H test
to define the relevant geographic market would be inappropriate (Elzinga and
Swisher, 2011).
2.2 Critical loss analysis
Critical loss analysis involves three consecutive steps. The first is to compute the
hospitals’ contribution margins, defined as price minus average variable costs.
The contribution margin is used in step two to identify the percentage of
patients hospitals could lose before a small price increase – 5% is typical –
becomes unprofitable: this is the critical loss. The final step is to analyse whether
the actual loss of patients would exceed the critical loss if all hospitals in the
proposed market implemented a small but significant non-transitory price
increase. If so, then the price increase would be unprofitable, indicating that the
10 When a patient from outside an area receives care from a hospital inside that area then that is an
inflow of a patient but an export of hospital services. When a patient from inside an area receives care
from a hospital outside that area then that is an outflow of a patient but an import of hospital services.
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hypothetical geographic market is too narrow and should be expanded to
include more hospitals. The expected actual loss of patients is most commonly
assessed using the concept of contestable zip codes. That is, all patients currently
choosing a hospital within the proposed market but living in an area where
Box 1. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) vs Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare Corporation (ENH)
In February 2004, the FTC issued an antitrust complaint against ENH – a health
system on Lake Michigan’s north shore close to Chicago, Illinois. The FTC
alleged that following the acquisition of the nearby Highland Park Hospital in
January 2000, ENH was able to raise its prices far above comparable hospitals
as a result of the transaction. When seeking a remedy to restore competition, the
FTC’s complaint contemplated a divestiture of the acquired hospital (FTC,
2004). In his initial decision, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ordered this
contemplated relief (FTC, 2005). Despite the criticism of some legal experts (e.g.
Harris and Argue, 2006; Campbell, 2007), on appeal, this decision was
confirmed by the full FTC. However, as much time had already elapsed after the
merger, rather than divestiture, it ordered ENH to establish two separate and
independent negotiating teams to allow health insurers to negotiate separately
again with ENH and its former competitor Highland Park Hospital (FTC,
2007). In 2008, ENH accepted this remedy.
In contrast to previous hospital merger cases in the United States, in the Evanston
case both the ALJ and the FTC concluded that the relevant geographic market
was rather small. The ALJ’s decision contained some interesting observations
on defining geographic hospital markets. First, the Elzinga–Hogarty test, given
its methodological shortcomings, was deemed ‘not appropriate’ for defining
geographic hospital markets. Second, courts do not compel ‘scientific precision’,
but any hospital market should be ‘well-defined’ and correspond to the
‘commercial realities’ of the hospital industry. Third, determination of the
geographic market must be based on a dynamic ‘forward looking’ analysis, which
considers where consumers have gone in the past for hospital services, as well as
their future ‘practical alternatives’. Fourth, in a managed care setting a key issue
in determining the geographic market is identifying the hospitals that managed
care organisations need in their provider networks to establish viable, competitive
networks. On appeal the full FTC agreed with ENH that the ALJ did not address
the central issue in defining geographic markets; that is, over what geographic
region could a hypothetical monopolist impose a Small but Significant Non-
transitory Increase in Price? However, as the consummated merger enabled ENH
to raise prices substantially through a unilateral exercise of market power, it was
concluded that the geographic area of the merged hospitals constituted a well-
defined geographic market from an antitrust perspective.
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many other patients (e.g. 50% or more) select hospitals outside the proposed
market would switch to those outside hospitals in response to a price increase.
Under this assumption, critical loss analysis also suffers from the ‘silent majority
fallacy’. Danger and Frech (2001) detail an important methodological shortcoming
of critical loss analysis: market definition via this approach is highly sensitive to the
initial degree of market power. If price is already at the monopoly level, then any
further increase in price will by definition result in lower profits. In such a situation,
critical loss analysis incorrectly leads to an overly broad market.
3. Hospital merger control in Germany
3.1 Act against Restraints of Competition
The 1958 Act against Restraints of Competition [Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbes-
chra¨nkungen (GWB)] assigned the task of protecting competition at the national
level in Germany to the Federal Cartel Office [Bundeskartellamt (BKA)]. A 1993
amendment introduced a procedure for preventive merger control in the GWB,
which has been enforced relatively strictly, leading to a considerable number of
merger prohibitions, proposal modifications and dismissals (Motta, 2004: 11). A
main principle behind competition policy in Germany is to protect the economic
freedom of competitors. A merger will therefore be prohibited if it is ‘‘expected to
create or strengthen a dominant position’’, unless it ‘‘will also lead to improvements
of the conditions of competition and that these improvements will outweigh the
disadvantages of dominance’’ (Section 36.1). According to the GWB, a firm is
dominant when in a properly defined market it (i) has no competitors, (ii) is not
exposed to substantial competition or (iii) has a paramount market position relative
to its competitors (Section 19.2). To assess a firm’s market position, several factors
should be taken into account: its market share, its financial power, any legal or
factual barriers to market entry by other firms, actual or potential competition by
firms and the ability of the opposite market side to resort to other firms.
The BKA’s preventive merger control applies only to mergers whose aggregate
global sales would exceed h500 million, with at least one firm realising h25
million in Germany. Mergers subject to control must subject themselves to
examination by the BKA whose preliminary review leads to a more substantive
examination if necessary. The BKA decides whether a merger is cleared, pro-
hibited or cleared conditionally. If cleared, the parties must inform the BKA
upon its consummation. Although the notification threshold is rather high, that
it has resulted in an overly permissive antitrust enforcement policy is unlikely; so
far mergers between German hospitals have typically involved the acquisition of
public hospitals by large private hospital chains. It is important to recognise,
however, that mergers between small independent hospitals may not be subject
to the BKA’s merger control, even though they may substantially reduce com-
petition at the local or regional level.
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3.2 Experiences with hospital merger control
Until 2011 the BKA has examined more than 100 hospital merger cases, clearing
most within one month. Some, however, have been challenged (Bangard, 2007;
Denzel et al., 2010). Since 2000, an increasing number of public hospitals were
sold to private hospital chains driven mainly by public authorities’ large budget
deficits at the regional and municipal levels (Schulten, 2006). To ensure that
hospital markets are organised as competitively as possible, the BKA applies the
GWB rather strictly in the industry. From 2005 to 2010, five proposed hospital
mergers were prohibited and one was cleared, subject to the condition that the
merging parties sell one hospital location to a third party (Table 1).
The first BKA-prohibited hospital merger was in March 2005, after which the
Federal Court of Justice [Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)] in Germany confirmed the
GWB to be fully applicable to the hospital industry (BGH, 2008). No social or
hospital law precludes the GWB’s merger control provisions to markets for
hospital services. In addition, the court concluded that the objectives of antitrust
law and health policy do not conflict with one another.
3.3 Approach to defining geographic hospital markets
The BKA defines the relevant product market as the market for acute hospital
services, including general hospitals and specialised clinics but excluding reha-
bilitation and other nursing centres. To define geographic hospital markets, the
BKA uses a backward-looking approach based on the analysis of patient flow
Table 1. Hospital merger cases in Germany, 2005–2010
Merging hospitals Year Conclusion by the BKA
Rho¨n and Bad Neustadt/Mellrichstadt 2005 Prohibited and confirmed in court
Rho¨n and Eisenhu¨ttenstadt 2005 Prohibited
Asklepios and LBK Hamburg 2005 Cleared, subject to the condition
of selling one location
Nu¨rnberg and Nu¨rnberger Land 2005 Cleared
Humaine and Fresenius 2006 Cleared
Greifswald and Wolgast 2006 Prohibiteda
Hannover and Wunstorf 2007 Cleared
LBK Hamburg and Mariahilf 2007 Prohibited
Rho¨n and Wesermarsch Klinik 2008 Cleared
Freiburg and Bad Krozingen 2009 Cleared
Nordhessen and Werra-Meißner-Kreis 2009 Prohibited
BKA5Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office).
aIn January 2008, the Federal Minister of Economics and Technology (Bundesminister fu¨r Wirstschaft
und Technologie) permitted the merger on appeal, arguing that, despite its likely anticompetitive
effects, it served the public interest since one party involved was a small university hospital suffering
from scale-related inefficiencies.
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data. Rather than ‘merely theoretical’ hospital alternatives, the BKA argues that
only ‘practical’ alternatives should be taken into account when defining the
relevant geographic market (BKA, 2005a). By considering where patients have
gone in the past for hospital services, the BKA infers which hospitals are sub-
stitutable from the patient’s perspective. Generally, the BKA’s approach to
defining geographic hospital markets consists of two steps. First, the catchment
areas of each hospital – starting with an area of , 1003 120km around the
merging hospitals – are identified. The second, decisive step is to analyse the
travel behaviour of patients.
Because the BKA approach to defining geographic hospital markets also relies
on patient flow data, at first sight it seems closely related to the widely criticised
E–H test. There are, however, two fundamental differences. First, when com-
puting the export of hospital services, the BKA does not aggregate patient
inflows to all hospitals within the hypothesised geographic market, but rather
takes into account only patients travelling to the merging hospitals. Over-
statement of the true size of geographic hospital markets – an important pitfall
when analysing patient flow data – is therefore less likely. This is illustrated by
the hypothetical case described in Box 2.
The second difference between the E–H test and the BKA’s approach is that
the latter is based on pragmatic considerations, including case-specific char-
acteristics, rather than fixed thresholds. From the BKA’s decisions, it follows that
generally only areas from which a substantial percentage of patients travel to
one of the merging hospitals are potentially included in the relevant market
(Kallfass and Kuchinke, 2006). That is, mutual patient flows between both areas
need to be substantial.11 Whereas the E–H test tends to include gradually more
areas simply to meet the 90% or 75% import and export thresholds, the BKA
only includes or excludes neighbouring areas after assessing their specific
competitive situation.
The BKA’s approach is unlikely to suffer from the ‘silent majority fallacy’: it
recognises that the presence of travelling patients does not necessarily restrain
hospitals from behaving anti-competitively. More specifically, although the
E–H test incorrectly assumes that the presence of some travelling patients dis-
ciplines hospitals from exercising market power over the silent majority of non-
travelling patients, the BKA assumes that only the presence of many travelling
patients disciplines hospitals from exercising market power over the then silent
minority of non-travelling patients. Despite its use of patient flow data to define
geographic hospital markets, the BKA is therefore not likely to overstate the
true size of the relevant market. On the contrary and as argued by Badtke
(2008), the BKA’s approach may result in hospital markets that are too narrowly
defined. Hence, the BKA seems keener on avoiding the risk of being too lenient
(i.e. allowing hospital mergers that may restrict actual hospital competition)
11 The threshold for this is not specified by the BKA (Denzel et al., 2010).
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rather than being too stringent (i.e. prohibiting hospital mergers that may not
restrict actual hospital competition).
3.4 Landmark case: Rho¨n-Klinikum AG/Bad Neustadt/Mellrichstadt
In August 2004, Rho¨n-Klinikum AG, one of the leading private hospital groups
in Germany, notified the BKA of its plan to acquire two public hospitals: one in
Bad Neustadt (, 150km east of Frankfurt am Main) and one in Mellrichstadt
(, 15km north of Bad Neustadt). At the time, Rho¨n-Klinikum operated
30 hospitals nationwide with an aggregate turnover of more than h1000 million;
the BKA therefore decided to substantively assess the likely competitive effects
of the proposed acquisition and concluded that the transaction would further
strengthen Rho¨n-Klinikum’s dominant position in the two markets concerned
Box 2. Illustration of Bundeskartellamt (BKA) approach vs
Elzinga–Hogarty (E–H) test for defining geographic hospital markets
Consider a hypothesised geographic market, including three hospitals: two
merging general hospitals A and C and one academic teaching hospital B. The
latter offers services highly differentiated from those offered by the other
hospitals. Therefore, 70% of its 10,000 patients come from outside the
hypothesised market, whereas the percentage of travelling patients for the
other hospitals is only 10% of 5000 patients each. Under these hypothetical
circumstances, it is easy to see how the BKA approach defines a different
relevant geographic market than the E–H test. The relevant statistic for the
export of hospital services in the E–H test [‘little out from inside’ (LOFI)] is
40%, being total patient inflow in the area (7000123 500) as percentage of
the total number of patients treated there (20,000). This is higher than
the threshold generally used for a ‘weak’ market. Hence, according to the
E–H test the geographic market is too narrowly defined and its boundary
should therefore be expanded. When the BKA computes the export of
hospital services from the hypothesised geographic market, however, it only
analyses the inflow of patients to the merging hospitals (A and C) rather than
all three hospitals in the region. The percentage of exports is then 10%, being
patient inflow of both hospitals (1000) as percentage of the number of
patients treated by those hospitals (10,000). This low percentage implies that
the hypothesised geographic market should not be enlarged. As the highly
differentiated product provided by hospital B induces travel for specific
reasons, it would indeed be incorrect to conclude that hospitals A and C face
competition from hospitals elsewhere. Note that if hospital B provided the
same services as the other two hospitals while still attracting many patients
from outside the hypothesised market (e.g. due to its high quality), the BKA
approach could result in a market that is too narrowly defined.
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(BKA, 2005a). It is a landmark case because it was the first time the BKA
prohibited a hospital merger and prevailed in court.12
3.4.1 Geographic market definition
By applying its two-step approach to defining geographic hospital markets, the
BKA in this particular case concluded that (i) for most general hospitals, the vast
majority of patients live nearby, implying that the export of hospital services
from one area to another is low and (ii) most patients do not travel to more
distant alternatives, implying that the import of hospital services from one area
to another is also low. The BKA agreed that some patients are willing to travel;
however, as they do so for particular reasons (e.g. specialised care), such
behaviour was not expected to significantly affect hospital competition. As a
result, two different geographic markets were defined that were both rather
small: the Bad Neustadt/Bad Kissingen market and the Meiningen market. With
these areas, the merger would have increased Rho¨n-Klinikum’s market shares to
, 65% and 60%, respectively (BKA, 2005a).
3.4.2 Court decisions
Following its decision to prohibit the hospital merger, the BKA twice prevailed
in court. First, in April 2007, the Du¨sseldorf Higher Regional Court (Ober-
landesgericht Du¨sseldorf ) confirmed the approach used by the BKA for defining
the relevant geographic market. The court stated that patient flow data provide
reliable information about the substitutability of hospitals and the BKA could
therefore use it for market definition. As hospitals’ substitutability crucially
depends on the distance patients are willing to travel, the court argued that it
was appropriate to analyse where patients had gone in the past. The conclusion
was that areas only belong to the same geographic market when mutual patient
flows between them are ‘substantial’ (OGD, 2007). Second, an appeal on points
of law by the merging hospitals was dismissed in January 2008 by the Federal
Court of Justice, making the BKA’s prohibition of the merger final. The highest
court in Germany confirmed that the use of patient flow data is appropriate
when defining the relevant geographic market in hospital merger cases. The
BKA’s approach to defining geographic markets was deemed ‘legally tenable’
(BGH, 2008). In its decision, the court also argued that patients’ potential
hospital alternatives should not be taken into account if they had not actually
visited them in the past, implying that most value is attached to revealed pre-
ference data, but emphasising that potential alternatives were not meaningless.
They were called ‘particularly useful’ when assessing the factors that may limit
or extend the merged hospital’s market power.
12 Shortly after this decision, the BKA also prohibited Rho¨n-Klinikum AG from acquiring the
municipal hospital in Eisenhu¨ttenstadt, concluding that the merger would strengthen Rho¨n’s already
dominant position in the the Frankfurt/Oder region, because it already owned the principal hospital in
that area (BKA, 2005b).
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4. Hospital merger control in the Netherlands
4.1 Competition Act and guidelines for antitrust enforcement
in health care
The Dutch Competition Act [Mededingingswet (Mw)], implemented in 1998
and amended in 2004, is enforced by the Netherlands Competition Authority
[Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa)]. In addition to prohibiting cartels
and abusively dominant positions, the Mw practises preventive merger control.
The latter generally only applies to mergers between companies whose com-
bined turnover has exceeded h113 million in the preceding calendar year, with at
least h30 million realised in the Netherlands by at least two of the companies
involved. Because geographic markets for health care tend to be small and the
emerging competition in the Dutch healthcare system is fragile, as competition
among providers has only gradually been introduced since 2005, thresholds for
the healthcare industry were temporarily lowered in January 2008 to h55 mil-
lion and h10 million, respectively. To prevent them from applying to mergers of
companies whose healthcare services are but a small part of their business, a
third threshold was added: for at least two of the companies involved, turnover
from healthcare services alone must exceed h5.5 million.13
Qualifying merger proposals must be reported to the NMa before con-
summation for a general review. A merger requires a license when there is reason
to assume that ‘‘a dominant position that appreciably restricts competition on
the Dutch market or a part thereof could arise or be strengthened as a result of
the said concentration’’ (Mw, Section 37.2). Upon license application, the NMa
begins a more substantial assessment of the proposed merger, deciding to allow,
prohibit or conditionally allow the merger based on its findings: ‘‘A license shall
be refused if, as a result of the proposed concentration, effective competition on
the Dutch market or a part thereof would be appreciably impeded, specifically
as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant economic position’’
(Mw, Section 41.2). On the basis of supranational European guidelines, a
dominant position is defined as ‘‘a position of one or more undertakings that
enables them to prevent effective competition being maintained on the Dutch
market or a part thereof, by giving them the power to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of their competitors, their suppliers, their customers or
end-users’’ (Mw, Section 1.i).
In 2002, the NMa issued their first guidelines for antitrust enforcement policy
in markets for health care, updating them in 2007 and 2010, which include a
section on preventive merger control. After explaining the procedures of the
notification and licensing phases, they discuss how they assess a dominant position.
Several elements are considered, including market shares and concentration levels,
13 The lowered thresholds are particularly relevant to nursing homes and home healthcare organi-
sations, as mergers in these markets generally do not qualify for the general thresholds.
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countervailing buyer power and the likelihood of entry (NMa, 2010). When
assessing the likely competitive effects of a proposed hospital merger, the NMa
takes into account the opinion of the Dutch Healthcare Authority [Nederlandse
Zorgautoriteit (NZa)].14
4.2 Experiences with hospital merger control
Before 2004, the NMa did not assess proposed hospital mergers; they argued
that hospitals were not able to compete because of supply and price regulation.
In 2004, however, the NMa issued a position document in which it stated that
institutional and regulatory changes in Dutch healthcare markets had created
scope for competition (NMa, 2004a). Because providers of hospital services
compete, the Mw applied to the hospital industry.
Until 2011, eleven hospital mergers have been assessed by the NMa (Table 2),15
seven of which did not require a license. In only four cases, a license was required.
After the substantive assessment, three were cleared and one was withdrawn.
Table 2. NMa’s decisions in hospital merger cases in the Netherlands, 2004–2010
Merging hospitals Year Decision 1st stage
Decision 2nd
stage
Juliana Kinderziekenhuis/RKZ and Ziekenhuis
Leyenburg
2004 No license required –
Ziekenhuis Hilversum and Ziekenhuis Gooi-Noord 2005 License required License issued
Erasmus MC and Havenziekenhuis 2005 No license required –
Ziekenhuis Walcheren and
Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen
2006 License required Application
withdrawn
Laurentius Ziekenhuis and St. Jans Gasthuis 2007 No license required –
Vlietland Ziekenhuis and MC Rijnmond Zuid 2007 No license required –
MC Alkmaar and Gemini Ziekenhuis 2007 No license required –
St. Lucas Ziekenhuis and Ziekenhuis Delfzicht 2008 No license required –
Ziekenhuis Walcheren and
Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen
2008 License required License issueda
Bethesda Ziekenhuis and Scheperziekenhuis 2009 No license required –
Noorderbreedte and Ziekenhuis De Tjongerschans 2010 License required License issued
NMa5Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Netherlands Competition Authority).
aIn March 2009, the NMa approved the merger to ‘safeguard the quality of basic hospital care’ in the
central region of the sparsely populated province of Zeeland. To prevent the merged hospital from
exercising market power, ‘strict conditions’ were imposed (NMa, 2009). The geographic market was
not in dispute.
14 The NZa is an autonomous administrative agency under the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare
and Sport that since 2006 is responsible for monitoring and regulating healthcare markets in the
Netherlands.
15 Note that the same merger between Ziekenhuis Walcheren and Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen was
reported to the NMa in both 2006 and 2008.
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No decision has therefore been challenged and, unlike the United States and
Germany, no court decisions on hospital market definition have yet been made,
implying no industry-specific case law.
4.3 Landmark case: Ziekenhuis Hilversum – Ziekenhuis Gooi-Noord
In April 2004, two neighbouring general hospitals (Hilversum and Gooi-Noord),
located in the region between Amsterdam and Utrecht, notified the NMa about their
plan to merge. After the first general assessment in the notification phase, the NMa
in July 2004 concluded that a license was required for the proposed merger as it
could restrict actual competition in the Dutch market for hospital care. Following
the hospitals’ application for a license, the NMa in December 2004 started a more
specific and substantial assessment of the concentration. As the first proposed hos-
pital merger subject to a substantive assessment by the NMa, it therefore created a
precedent and constituted a landmark case.
4.3.1 Geographic market definition
On the basis of market research and case law from other countries, the NMa
identified two separate product markets: one for inpatient and one for outpatient
general hospital care. In the first general assessment during the notification phase,
the E–H test was used to define the geographic market, which turned out to be
rather small, despite the E–H tendency to overstate true market size. The NMa
therefore concluded that patients currently preferred hospitals close to their homes
and that, as a consequence, the proposed merger would substantially lessen com-
petition (NMa, 2004b). At the same time, they declared the E–H test static and
concluded that further research on where patients would be willing to go when given
incentive to do so was therefore necessary.
The in-depth analysis carried out in the licensing phase had three major
findings. First, general practitioners (GPs),16 other hospitals and health insurers
were interviewed. GPs and other hospitals expected patients to bypass the
merged hospitals if they exercised market power, but health insurers did not
expect patients’ willingness to travel to be high. Second, patients’ stated pre-
ferences were investigated by a conjoint analysis,17 the result of which was that
the vast majority of patients would travel to other hospitals if the nearest hos-
pital increased its price or lowered its quality. This indicated that the relevant
geographic market was larger than that initially assumed. Third, econometric
simulations to examine patients’ willingness to travel to alternative hospitals
16 In the Netherlands, patients require a referral from their GP to visit a hospital for non-emergency
care.
17 Conjoint analysis deals with situations in which a patient has to choose among hospital options
that simultaneously vary among two or more attributes. The hypothetical problem is how to trade off the
possibility that hospital X is better than hospital Y on attribute A but worse than hospital Y on attribute B
and so on. The goal of conjoint analysis is to determine how much each hospital attribute contributes to
patients’ preferences.
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using actual hospital choices (revealed preferences) within a logit demand model
confirmed the initial assumption that the geographic market was rather small.
Therefore, unfortunately for the NMa, the research findings in this merger
case were ambiguous. On the basis of the geographic market defined on the
stated preference data, the merger should be allowed; when defined on revealed
preference data, the merger should be prohibited. Confronted with these con-
tradictory findings, the NMa concluded that, although greater value should be
attached to revealed preferences, patients’ willingness to travel could increase in the
near future because of the increasing availability of consumer information about
quality differences within the Dutch hospital sector. According to the NMa it was
therefore ‘‘less evident that greater weight should be given to the revealed preferences
in the assessment of the present case’’ (NMa, 2005). As a result, the NMa decided
there were ‘insufficient grounds’ for defining a smaller geographical market.
4.3.2 Final decision
In June 2005, the NMa decided to clear the merger because there was ‘‘insuf-
ficient evidence to deem it plausible that a dominant position will arise or be
strengthened as a result of the proposed merger on the markets for clinical and
non-clinical general hospital care’’ (NMa, 2005). The conclusion implied that
greater weight was given to consumers’ stated preferences – even though they
admitted that what people say they will do is often not the same as what they
will do should the hypothetical situation become reality. In addition, the expec-
tation that Dutch patients’ willingness to travel was likely to increase because
increased transparency was not based on empirical evidence and therefore (highly)
speculative. All in all, this decision shows that, contrary to its German counter-
part, the Dutch competition authority is keen on avoiding the risk of being too
stringent (i.e. prohibiting hospital mergers that may not restrict actual hospital
competition) rather than being too lenient (i.e. allowing hospital mergers that
may restrict actual hospital competition). Future analysis of post-merger market
performance results should reveal whether the NMa erred in this case.18
5. Discussion
To safeguard competition in market-oriented healthcare systems, preventive
merger control is critical. For hospital services, however, its major problem is to
define the relevant geographic market. Evidence from the United States shows
18 Besides negative quality effects, mergers may also result in higher prices. In the Netherlands,
hospitals and health insurers are allowed to freely negotiate prices for about 70% of the hospital services
in 2012, starting from 10% in 2005. As mergers reduce the number of hospital alternatives, they lower
insurers’ bargaining clout and may therefore eliminate the emerging price competition. In a first retro-
spective analysis of this particular hospital merger, Kemp and Severijnen (2010) indeed found a statis-
tically significant price increase for hip surgery of which prices are freely negotiable since 2005. As their
analysis included only one procedure, however, no general conclusions about the effects of the merger
could be drawn.
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that the method used for this has a huge impact on the outcome of hospital merger
control. Here, we examined how geographic hospital markets are defined in two
European countries with competitive hospital industries: Germany and the
Netherlands. For each country, we discussed an important landmark case in
which the definition of the relevant geographic market played a decisive role.
As a general observation, we argue that defining geographic hospital markets
in Germany and the Netherlands seems less complicated than in the United
States because of the absence of managed care. In such a setting, typical in the
United States, the key issue for geographic market definition is which hospitals
are important for managed care organisations to include in their networks.
In a setting where hospitals compete directly for patients by non-price factors
only – as is the case in Germany and the Netherlands because in both countries
out-of-pocket payments, if present at all, do not differ across hospital alter-
natives – hospitals’ substitutability crucially depends on patients’ willingness
to travel.19 When used properly, commonly available patient flow data is then
useful for defining geographic hospital markets.20 Exploring innovative
approaches,21 empirical analyses of where patients have gone in the past can be
used to substantiate any conclusions about other hospitals as feasible alter-
natives for the merging hospitals (Varkevisser et al., 2010). In addition, as seen
from the FTC’s Hospital Merger Retrospectives Project (Farrell et al., 2009),
ex post analysis of consummated hospital mergers can provide important
information about ex ante geographic market definition for future cases
(Ashenfelter et al., 2011).
An important conclusion is that, despite the fact that within the EU national
antitrust laws are to a large extent based on the same legal principles, enfor-
cement policies in German and Dutch hospital markets are notably different.
Germany’s BKA follows a thorough and pragmatic two-step approach to ana-
lyse patient flow data for geographic market definition, which is more likely
19 Although hospital prices in the Netherlands may differ across hospitals, these differences do not
matter to patients because the mandatory annual deductible (220 in 2012) is far below the price of any
hospital service charged by any hospital.
20 Despite the gradual introduction of managed competition in the Netherlands, hospitals there also
compete directly for patients through non-price factors. So far, Dutch health insurers have been quite
reluctant to selectively contract with hospitals. However, patient flow data would become less useful for
defining Dutch hospital markets if insurer–hospital negotiations over network participation and com-
position increased. Then health insurers, rather than individual patients, will be the relevant hospital
customers from an antitrust perspective. In such an environment, the option demand approach would be
more appropriate for defining hospital markets (Varkevisser et al., 2008).
21 In recent years, several new approaches to defining geographic hospital markets have been sug-
gested in the health economics literature, including time elasticity, competitor share and option demand.
These new approaches provide strong evidence that hospitals may possess far more market power than
previously acknowledged (Dranove and Sfekas, 2009). New methods have actually been used in a recent
hospital merger case. In FTC and State of Ohio vs ProMedica Health System, the court – which so far has
sided with the FTC – cited in its written opinion the ‘willingness-to-pay’ analysis brought forward by the
plaintiff (see http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1010167/110329promedicafindings.pdf).
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to result in hospital markets that are too narrowly defined. In the first Dutch
hospital merger case in which definition of the geographic market played a
decisive role, the NMa adopted an effects analysis that is more likely to approve
mergers. That is, although the analysis of patient flow data pointed to the
presence of a rather small market in which the proposed hospital merger would
substantially reduce competition, the NMa used stated preference data to argue
that the relevant market might change substantially in the near future in the case
of readily available quality information. Hence, we find that different methods
of defining geographic hospital markets result in much more stringent hospital
merger control in Germany than in the Netherlands. Given the uncertainties
in defining appropriate hospital markets, the German competition authority
seems to be inclined to avoid the risk of being too permissive, whereas the
opposite holds for the Dutch situation. As a result, in Germany, since 2005, five
proposed hospital mergers have been prohibited by the BKA and only one
was cleared, subject to the condition that the merging parties sell one hospital
location to a third party. By contrast, all proposed hospital mergers in the
Netherlands have been allowed thus far.
Empirical studies have provided clear evidence that hospital mergers may
have serious anticompetitive effects, while claimed cost savings are most often
not achieved (Vogt and Town, 2006; Weil, 2010). Therefore, the reduction in
social welfare caused by allowing a hospital merger that restricts hospital
competition is likely to be greater than the reduction in social welfare caused by
blocking a hospital merger that does not restrict hospital competition. This
implies that for society the risk of being too permissive with regard to hospital
mergers may be larger than the risk of being too stringent.22 This asymmetry is
even more relevant in light of the following two facts. First, the unscrambling of
consummated hospital mergers is rather problematic. If there is real clinical and
medical integration, then divestiture is even less likely to be a good remedy, as it
then has a greater risk of unforeseen costs and failures. This makes pre-merger
enforcement decisions in this industry more important. Second, ex post identi-
fication of the exercise of market power is difficult in most European countries
where hospitals typically compete for patients by quality rather than price. In
hospital markets with quality competition, post merger antitrust enforcement
may therefore not be an effective safety net. Hence, in view of the uncertainties
about the true size of geographic hospital markets, antitrust enforcement
agencies may do better to risk being too restrictive when assessing proposed
hospital mergers rather than being too permissive. This may be particularly true
for the emerging hospital markets in Germany and in the Netherlands, given
their long-standing tradition of collective bargaining and concerted practice, and
the substantial entry barriers.
22 Note that such an asymmetry has also been identified for other industries, for example, Le´veˆque
(2006).
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